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Abstract
This paper focuses on the Cashless Debit Card trial in the East Kimberley, 
Western Australia. The card aims to restrict cash and purchases to curb 
alcohol consumption, illegal drug use and gambling. The card targets 
Indigenous people disproportionately – 82.0% of the people in the East 
Kimberley trial are Indigenous. The current study is based on 13 months 
of research into the Australian Government’s trial of the card in the East 
Kimberley. We review the card in the context of current policies to manage 
Indigenous consumption. We then look at aspects of the trial in the East 
Kimberley, including its implementation, lack of community engagement, 
community resistance and effects on money management. We find not 
only that the trial was chaotic, but that its logic is deeply flawed, and 
disconnected from the relational poverty experienced by people receiving 
state benefits. We also find that the card has become a symbol of 
government control and regulation in the study site.
Keywords: Cashless Debit Card, East Kimberley, conditionality, punitive 
welfare, Indigenous policy
Working Paper No. 121/2017 
ISSN 1442-3871 
ISBN 978-1-925286-20-5 
An electronic publication downloaded 
from <caepr.anu.edu.au>.
For a complete list of CAEPR  
Working Papers, see 
<caepr.anu.edu.au/publications/
working.php>.
Centre for Aboriginal Economic  
Policy Research 
Research School of Social Sciences 
College of Arts & Social Sciences 
The Australian National University
Front cover image: 
Terry Ngamandarra Wilson, Gulach 
(detail), painting on bark, private 
collection © Terry Ngamandarra, 
licensed by Viscopy, 2016
iv  Klein and Razi
Centre for Abor ig ina l  Economic Pol icy Research
Acronyms
ANU The Australian National University
CAEPR Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research
CDC Cashless Debit Card
CDEP Community Development Employment Projects
CDP Community Development Programme
FOI freedom of information
NTER Northern Territory Emergency Response
PM&C  Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank all of the people who have contributed to this 
research, especially the many that supported and informed the research 
in an anonymous capacity. Our thanks also to the East Kimberley Legal 
Services Network for their significant assistance. We also thank Professor 
Jon Altman for his generous guidance, support and comments on drafts, 
as well as Dr Shelley Bielefeld for earlier support in the research design. We 
thank members of the ‘On culture, power and practice’ research cluster at 
the University of Melbourne for feedback on earlier drafts.
caepr.anu.edu.au
Contents
Series Note  ii
Abstract iii
Acknowledgments iv
Acronyms iv
Introduction 1
Income management and Indigenous policy in Australia 2
Methods 3
Bringing the card to the East Kimberley  4
A disordered experiment 5
Wrap-around services 6
The community panel 6
Theory of change and inducing hardship 6
Making money management hard 7
Depoliticisation of poverty and unemployment 8
Constructing community and fragmenting social relations 11
Excluding community  12
Resistance and agency  12
Conclusion 13
Notes 14
References 16
Tables and figures
Table 1. Key items for cash use (before the Cashless Debit Card) 7
Table 2. Items that are harder to purchase under the Cashless Debit Card 8
Table 3. Socioeconomic data, Kununurra  9
Table 4. Socioeconomic data, Wyndham  9
Table 5. Breaching rates under the Community Development Programme, 
Western Australia  10
Working Paper No. 121/2017  v 
vi  Klein and Razi
Centre for Abor ig ina l  Economic Pol icy Research
caepr.anu.edu.au
Introduction
I n this paper, we focus on the Cashless Debit Card (CDC) trial in the East Kimberley in Western Australia. 
The trial began in early 2016 in both Ceduna (South 
Australia) and the East Kimberley (Western Australia), 
quarantining 80% of state benefits received by all 
working-age people (15–64 years) in the trial sites. 
The Commonwealth legislation – the Social Security 
Legislation Amendment (Debit Card Trial) Act 2015 
– passed by the Coalition government with Labor 
support, aims to restrict cash and purchases to curb 
alcohol consumption, illegal drug use and gambling. 
The CDC regulates state benefits at the merchant level 
on restricted items. It also limits the amount of cash that 
can be withdrawn to 20% of the total money recipients 
receive. Put into figures, on a single Newstart fortnightly 
payment of $538.80, it allows a recipient to withdraw 
$107.76, while the remaining $431.04 is quarantined. 
The CDC trial targets all working-age people 
(15–64 years) living in the region who receive state 
benefits. This compulsorily includes people receiving 
disability, parenting, carers, unemployed and youth 
allowance payments. People on the aged pension, on a 
veteran’s payment or earning a wage are excluded from 
the trial but can volunteer to take part. 
Although Australian Government communications state 
that the CDC is for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
welfare recipients, both the trial sites target Indigenous 
people disproportionately. Specifically, 75% of people 
in the Ceduna trial and 82% in the East Kimberley trial 
are Indigenous.1 The CDC was first proposed as a key 
recommendation in the review by mining billionaire 
Andrew Forrest2 of Indigenous employment and training 
(Forrest 2014). This recommendation followed various 
other forms of income management, including a program 
that was part of the 2007 Northern Territory Emergency 
Response (NTER). The NTER required the suspension of 
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 to explicitly target all 
Indigenous people on welfare.3
The specific aims of the trial outlined in the Social 
Security Legislation Amendment (Debit Card Trial) Act 
2015 are to:
• ‘reduce the amount of certain restrictable payments 
available to be spent on alcoholic beverages, 
gambling and illegal drugs’
• ‘determine whether such a reduction decreases 
violence or harm in trial areas’ 
• ‘determine whether such arrangements are more 
effective when community bodies are involved’
• ‘encourage socially responsible behaviour’. 
These aims suggest four assumptions underpinning 
the CDC:
• that there is an implicit nexus between unemployment 
and excessive use of alcohol, illegal drugs or 
gambling
• that behaviours, norms and aspirations of all people 
receiving welfare are currently problematic and need 
to change
• that a community panel presiding over trial 
participants would be effective 
• that the punitive approach of the CDC will be able 
to address addictions to illegal drugs, gambling and 
alcohol, and create that behaviour change.
Indue, a private company, was contracted to implement 
the CDC. Indue was granted more than $10.8 million4 
of the $18.9 million spent on the trial (up to April 2017) 
for operating the CDC during the trial (in both Ceduna 
and the East Kimberley) and building the technology. 
It has not been disclosed which specific elements of 
the intellectual property Indue owns, but some of it is 
retained for the company’s own commercial purposes. 
The Australian Government employed ORIMA, another 
private company, to design the evaluation of the CDC 
trial. ORIMA conducted the interim evaluation of the trial 
in August–September 2016 and the final evaluation in 
May–June 2017. The ORIMA interim evaluation was a 
key plank in the ‘evidence’ used by the government to 
justify the ongoing extension of the trial in March 2017.5 
The final evaluation was used to justify an extension of 
the trial to three other proposed sites. The interim ORIMA 
evaluation was criticised for flaws, including poor analysis 
and claims of causality.6 Similar issues with analysis 
and claims of causal success of the trial can be seen in 
the final evaluation. For example, both evaluations claim 
that there has been a reduction in the consumption of 
alcohol, illegal drugs and gambling. This is despite an 
absence of baseline data to test this claim, and numbers 
to suggest that for most receiving state payments use or 
overuse was not an issue. Specifically, the ORIMA interim 
evaluation showed that 45% of East Kimberley evaluation 
participants on the CDC reported they never had more 
than six drinks of alcohol at one time (only 10% did), 86% 
never used an illegal or prescription drug for nonmedical 
reasons, and 82% never gambled (ORIMA 2017a). 
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Both the interim and final ORIMA evaluations overlooked 
or superficially analysed important data that were not 
favourable to the trial. Although mentioning reports of 
a possible increase in crime,7 domestic violence8 and 
hardship on children in the East Kimberley, the interim 
report dismissed these increases, saying it did not 
have enough data to draw conclusions, and further 
examination was missing in the final report. In the ORIMA 
interim evaluation, only 22% of East Kimberley people 
surveyed on the CDC said that their lives were better. 
In contrast, 48% said that the trial had made their lives 
worse. In the East Kimberley ORIMA final evaluation, only 
18% said that their lives were better since being on the 
card, but 29% said that their lives were worse and 53% 
of people reported no change. Further, 29% of the East 
Kimberley interim evaluation participants on the card 
reported that their children were worse off under the trial 
(ORIMA 2017a:142). In the final evaluation, 49% of people 
on the card said that they could not look after their 
children better on the card. As Hunt states, reflecting on 
the interim evaluation report results: 
That almost half of the participants felt that the trial 
had made their lives worse is a worrying result, 
particularly given the rather limited substantiated 
positive results to date … the question is, at what 
cost? Is it acceptable for public policy to make more 
than twice as many participants’ lives worse in order 
that 22% can say their lives are better? (2017:5)
Despite the methodological flaws and the overlooking 
of significant hardship stated by survey participants, 
the government has claimed that the trial in the East 
Kimberley (and Ceduna) was a success (ORIMA 2017a,b).
In this paper, we present findings from a 13-month study 
examining the trial in the East Kimberley region. We 
interviewed people on the CDC, as well as community 
leaders, community services and policy makers, to 
understand the design, logic and impact of the card. 
We triangulated the research with discourse analysis 
and participant observation made by one author while 
living in the East Kimberley through the trial lead-up and 
implementation. We question ORIMA’s claim that the 
CDC has been successful, drawing attention to significant 
issues in the implementation, design and logic of the 
trial. We also respond to Hunt’s (2017) question about the 
cost associated with the CDC’s introduction, arguing that 
the card has had undesirable and unnecessary impacts 
on vulnerable people living in the East Kimberley. We 
proceed in three sections. First, we give a brief review of 
the policy logic underpinning past income management 
programs in Australia, which has been reasserted in 
the East Kimberley trial. Second, we introduce the 
methodology used in the study. Third, we present 
findings on how the CDC experiment was chaotically 
implemented, and the disorder and hardship it brought to 
people’s lives. 
Income management and 
Indigenous policy in Australia
The CDC is the latest iteration of the Australian 
Government’s income management regime. Income 
management was first introduced in Australia as 
legislated policy through the 2007 NTER under the 
Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment 
(Welfare Payment Reform) Act 2007 (Cwlth). Quarantining 
Indigenous people’s welfare payments was one of a 
raft of racially targeted measures,9 supported by a 
suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act. Compulsory 
income management under the NTER meant that 50% 
of state payments received by Indigenous people were 
quarantined through the EFTPOS BasicsCard. This card 
could be used to buy ‘essential items’ at accredited 
stores. The BasicsCard restricted the purchase of 
alcohol, tobacco, pornography and gambling. The 
government assumed that such restrictions would 
reduce social harm and promote responsible economic 
behaviour10 – logic that has been extended in the CDC 
trial. New Income Management (NIM) was introduced 
across the Northern Territory in 2010, replacing the initial 
NTER income management program. To reinstate the 
Racial Discrimination Act, NIM was broadened from 
the racially targeted regime to include non-Indigenous 
people. Regardless, 90.2% of people on NIM in the 
Northern Territory in 2013 were Indigenous (Bray 
et al. 2014). 
The Australian Government commissioned an evaluation 
of NIM in the Northern Territory. This evaluation showed 
that, despite the $410.5 million dollars spent on NIM, 
the program had not achieved the desired outcomes. 
Specifically, Bray et al. concluded that: 
A wide range of measures related to consumption, 
financial capability, financial harassment, alcohol 
and related behaviours, child health, child neglect, 
developmental outcomes, and school attendance 
have been considered as part of this evaluation … 
Despite the magnitude of the program the evaluation 
does not find any consistent evidence of income 
management having a significant systematic positive 
impact. (2014:316)
Although the Northern Territory was the first site of 
income management in Australia, Noel Pearson had 
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proposed ‘welfare reform’ before the NTER. Pearson 
identified income management as a way to instil 
responsibility in From hand out to hand up, published 
through The Cape York Institute think tank (CYI 2007). 
Income management in the Cape York model was 
introduced in 2008, targeting Indigenous people in four 
communities: Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale and Mossman 
Gorge. The Cape York model was more nuanced than 
the blanket application across the Northern Territory 
as part of the NTER. The Cape York Model included 
the establishment of the Families Responsibilities 
Commission (FRC) (Altman & Johns 2008). The FRC is 
a statutory body made up of Indigenous people (except 
the Chair, who is non-Indigenous), who are advised 
by authorities when individuals exhibit low school 
attendance, tenancy breaches, child safety issues or 
convictions in magistrates courts. These individuals 
appear in front of the FRC, where options are discussed 
with individuals on the best course to change their 
problematic behaviour. In these ‘conferences’, voluntary 
and compulsory income management were two options 
presented, but the majority of people going on income 
management were put on the compulsory measure 
(FaHCSIA 2012). In the 2012 Cape York Welfare Reform 
evaluation carried out by the Australian Government 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs, the evaluators argued that 
‘the evidence suggests that the impact of the local 
FRC Commissioners is in their listening, guiding and 
supporting role, rather than in the exercising of their 
punitive powers to order income management’ (FaHCSIA 
2012:50). 
In 2012, the Australian Government, as part of the Better 
Futures, Local Solutions policy framework, introduced 
‘place-based income management’ initiatives. This 
regime was trialled in five sites across Australia: Playford 
(South Australia), Shepparton (Victoria), Bankstown (New 
South Wales), Rockhampton (Queensland) and Logan 
(Queensland). An evaluation of place-based income 
management by Deloitte (2015) found limited positive 
outcomes for people on voluntary income management 
and no positive outcomes for people on compulsory 
income management. The report concluded that 
compulsory income management should be removed 
(Deloitte 2015, Bray 2016). 
In 2013, then Prime Minister Tony Abbott commissioned 
mining billionaire Andrew Forrest to conduct a 
review into Indigenous employment and training. The 
200 recommendations in Forrest’s review went far 
beyond the conventional remit of employment and 
training, rejecting forms of productive labour outside 
the market and including paternalistic interventions 
relating to early childhood development, housing, school 
attendance and welfare reform (Klein 2014). A pillar of 
the Forrest review was the Healthy Welfare Debit Card. 
Forrest recommended that the card should quarantine 
100% of state payments of all welfare recipients in a bid 
to restrict purchases of alcohol, drugs and gambling. 
In a number of public interviews, Forrest refrained from 
referring to the card as income management.11 The 
Australian Government is now trialling this card as the 
more benignly named Cashless Debit Card. 
Through his Minderoo Foundation, Forrest continues 
to play a role in promoting the CDC and lobbies for the 
card’s uptake around Australia. Minderoo has established 
a website dedicated to the CDC, where people can sign 
a petition to support the program coming to their town. 
Minderoo has also created and aired advertisements in 
support of the CDC on commercial television stations. 
The advertisements are voiced by Ian Trust, who is the 
executive director and founder of Wunan, an Aboriginal 
development organisation in the Kimberley. The 
advertisements specifically call for viewers to consider a 
trial in their community and sign a petition, on which they 
are asked to leave their contact details. Minderoo has 
also produced a video claiming chronic and widespread 
Indigenous violence and sexual abuse, and has shown 
the video to politicians to secure more trial sites for the 
CDC. The CDC was an Australian Government project, 
but Andrew Forrest’s involvement in policy design and 
implementation exposes a curious alliance between the 
state, enterprise and philanthropy.
Methods
The current study was based on 13 months of research 
into the trial of the CDC in the East Kimberley. This 
research was not meant to be an evaluation framed 
in terms of government priorities and perspectives, 
because such an evaluation can obscure key relations 
of power involved in the very process of framing ‘the 
problem’ (Altman & Russell 2012, Bray 2016). Instead, we 
used discourse analysis of speeches, documents and 
texts relating to the CDC. We also included structured 
interviews with people on the card (51 in total: 16 pretrial 
and 35 during the trial) and semistructured interviews (37) 
of key informants (all names and affiliations are withheld 
for anonymity). The key informant interviews were with 
people from a diverse group affected by the trial; all had 
knowledge of either the process involved in the card’s 
implementation or dealing with the effects of the trial. 
This group included representatives from community 
services, local business owners, government officials 
and leaders. The key informants were contacted directly 
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by the primary researcher to take part in semistructured 
interviews. They were asked about their understanding of 
the trial (and its implementation), their observations of the 
trial and any effects they had noticed. 
We triangulated discourse analysis and interviews with 
participant observation of people living in the towns, 
and witnessing lives and events unfold as the trial was 
rolled out. Observations were made through six visits 
to the trial site by the primary researcher, and by the 
secondary researcher – who lived in the trial site during 
the 15 months of the trial. 
Participants who took part in the research were involved 
in a variety of ways. Legal services in Kununurra and 
Wyndham agreed to interview clients receiving state 
benefits. For example, some clients were asked whether 
they would take part in a 30-minute questionnaire about 
the CDC following their legal interview. The legal services 
interviewed people before the trial began in April 2016, to 
understand the extent to which they had been consulted 
on, or knew about, the pending trial.12 We employed a 
research assistant from the East Kimberley to interview 
people on the CDC outside the legal service network, 
to broaden the range of people interviewed. The legal 
services and research assistant also interviewed people 
during the trial between November and December 2016 
to document their experiences on the card. Those on 
state benefits interviewed were not a representative 
sample – by community, gender or age. However, their 
insights did give an important picture to supplement other 
observations of the trial. 
Bringing the card to the East Kimberley 
The CDC was developed in response to a deficit 
narrative of an assumed alcohol, gambling and drug 
crisis in Indigenous communities, fuelling violence and 
lack of interest in capitalist formal employment.13 For 
example, Andrew Forrest, in making a case for the CDC, 
argued that:
Communities, especially remote first Australian 
communities, are desperate to stop the incoming tide 
of drugs and alcohol [enabled by unconditional state 
benefits]. They have exhausted every possible option 
in the search for effective methods for restricting 
the flow of cash to harmful uses and redirecting 
it to paying for essentials while in temporary and 
occasionally difficult circumstances, such as 
unemployment. (2014:102) 
Ian Trust has a similar view:
We’re supporting the trial because we need a catalyst 
to bring about social change … We’ve got 80 to 
90 per cent of our people on welfare, very few of 
our kids graduate from year 12, we have heaps of 
people in prisons, there’s big issues in regards to 
domestic violence and child neglect … It’s welfare 
from basically straight out of school from the grave 
[sic] and we don’t think that’s good enough for our 
people … We want them to have a better life and we 
think we’ve got to start with welfare reform. (Edwards 
2015:1)
These narratives of deficit make certain assumptions 
about Indigenous dysfunction. They also claim a causal 
relationship between people on state benefits and 
dysfunction. However, no evidence has been presented 
that these issues apply to everyone receiving state 
benefits in the East Kimberley, or that they do not apply to 
people who have employment. These assumptions also 
suggest that any dysfunction is primarily a behavioural 
problem of the individual, rather than a lack of formal 
employment in the East Kimberley (see below for a 
further exploration of structural unemployment in the 
East Kimberley). 
These assumptions also embody the normative views of 
responsible behaviour – that is, assimilation into settler 
norms through capitalist employment, home ownership 
and English education – and discourage anything 
else. For example, the playing of card games among 
Indigenous peoples in the East Kimberley is described 
very simplistically and pejoratively as gambling. Yet 
researchers have examined card games in Indigenous 
communities and have suggested that, although they may 
have some negative effects, they are important social 
interactions and means of economic distribution (Altman 
1985, McMillen & Donnelly 2008). This cultural activity has 
been reduced to ‘gambling’ and is now targeted under 
the CDC.
To criticise the narrative of deficit is not to overlook 
issues in the Kimberley relating to alcohol, drugs or 
violence. However, there is a need to critically engage 
with the lack of research establishing the actual extent 
of alcohol, illegal drug and gambling addiction;14 the 
appropriateness of a blanket compulsory measure; and 
the appropriateness of income management to deal with 
any addiction. For example, in response to the Australian 
Government’s 2017 plan to trial the drug testing of 
5000 welfare users, placing those testing positive on 
the CDC, the Clinical Director of St Vincent’s Hospital’s 
Alcohol and Drug Service in Sydney, Nadine Ezard, 
caepr.anu.edu.au
said, ‘By definition, people with severe substance use 
disorders are unable to modify their behaviour, even in 
the face of known negative consequences … In fact, an 
increase in stigma and anxiety for people with substance 
use disorders will exacerbate addiction issues rather than 
address them’ (St Vincent’s Health Australia 2017:1). It is 
a critical observation that, for the CDC trial in the East 
Kimberley (and Ceduna), the government did not see the 
need to propose the limited initiative of drug testing social 
benefit recipients, but instead compulsorily applied the 
CDC to all (predominantly Indigenous) recipients. This 
reveals the racialised belief held in government policy that 
Indigenous welfare users are drug and alcohol abusers.
The timing of the declaration of crisis and the intervention 
of the CDC is of concern because previous attempts 
by community leaders to gain government support for 
culturally significant programs have been unsuccessful. 
For example, women’s groups in the East Kimberley 
that were concerned about community development put 
forward a series of measures to government that would 
address issues, but these were not taken up by the 
government.15 Finally, declaring a crisis justified radical 
and racialised measures such as the CDC, which would 
not be acceptable under ordinary circumstances (Watson 
2009). The framing of crisis also bypasses inconvenient 
truths about the causes of transgenerational trauma 
relating to economic and colonial dispossession and 
continued structural violence.
All but one of the 35 people we interviewed on the CDC 
said that the trial had made their lives worse. This pattern 
is reflected in the ORIMA evaluation, which showed 
high levels of difficulty reported by those on the card. 
Our research suggests that this hardship was because 
of various aspects of the trial, including its chaotic 
implementation, and its ill-conceived theory of change 
and design. This affected people’s ability to management 
their money and fragmented social relations. These 
aspects are discussed further below.
A disordered experiment
The CDC trial began officially on 26 April 2016, originally 
for a year. However, in March 2017, the Australian 
Government announced that the trial would be extended 
for at least another year. By compulsorily including 
people in the trial, the government denied people the 
option to refrain from involvement. The trial was framed 
as an experiment, and its incomplete and ill-conceived 
design affected vulnerable lives in various ways. 
The introduction of the CDC was rushed and chaotic. 
It was publicly announced in February 2016 that the card 
would be trialled in the East Kimberley, and the rollout 
was from 26 April 2016. Although various aspects of the 
card would have been planned before this (e.g. leaders 
signing on to the card had been consulted by the 
government about the card as early as August 2015), 
the trial had less than two months lead-in time. As a 
result, most people who found themselves on the card 
did not understand what it was or how it worked. In 
interviews with 16 people in Kununurra and Wyndham 
before the trial, many said that they had received limited 
communication about the trial. For example, only 1 out 
of 16 people was told verbally about the trial; the rest 
received a letter in the mail telling them that they would 
be on the card. Mail communication has problems in a 
remote context – Kununurra has no home postal delivery, 
and identification is required for pickup at the local post 
office.16 Only 4 of the 16 people knew where to go for a 
replacement card, 8 knew where they could use the card, 
and 8 knew how much cash they would receive under 
the trial. Only 3 people of the 16 knew where to go for 
complaints about the card. 
Government communications about the CDC did not 
improve even after the card had been rolled out and 
people were living on it. Of the 35 people interviewed 
on the card during the trial, 3 were told how much 
money they would receive, 3 were told why they were 
being included in the trial, none reported being told how 
the card worked, 3 were told where to go if they had 
complaints, and 1 was told when the trial would finish. 
The rapid introduction of the trial also meant that services 
and facilities were not established in time for the rollout 
of the CDC. Although government officials tried to have 
the card accepted where all debit cards were accepted, 
in reality, people were still restricted from payments, such 
as those made online. Many places in the region – for 
example, the Kununurra cinema – did not have debit card 
facilities and only accepted cash. The restriction meant 
that card holders who had used up their cash allowance 
were turned away, some expressing a sense of shame 
in our interviews. Events such as the agricultural show 
publicised that the card could be used, but parents still 
had their cards rejected. One female interviewee with two 
children stated, ‘I don’t like it. Couldn’t use card when the 
side show came to Kununurra’.
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The chaotic and ill-conceived nature of the trial meant 
that some of the technologies designed to support 
participants actually made their experience harder. 
The mobile app was advertised as a way for people to 
view their account balance, but many people did not 
know how to use the app, own a smart phone or use the 
internet. (Of the 35 people who we spoke to on the card, 
only 4 said that they used the internet.) A 50-year-old 
man on disability support explained in his interview the 
issues he faced in trying to check his account balance: 
‘[My] money don’t last long, I don’t have phone, I can’t 
afford credit, I don’t have patience or time to check the 
balance’. The hotline set up for access to the Australian 
Government Department of Social Services in Canberra 
to answer questions about the trial sometimes provided 
contradictory information; this was often because details 
of the trial were still being worked out at the time of 
implementation. People were also mistakenly placed 
on the card who were not in the trial site. For example, 
people living in Halls Creek and even Kalumburu – both 
towns with limited internet and card facilitates – were put 
on the card. 
Wrap-around services
Even aspects of the experiment that were meant to 
support people on the CDC were poorly applied. The 
government aimed to support people on the card by 
providing $1.6 million to community organisations for 
‘wrap-around services’ across the two main towns of 
Wyndham and Kununurra. These funds were for ‘drug 
and alcohol services, additional capacity for existing 
mental health services, enhancing existing financial 
management services and extra funding for family 
violence services’ (DSS 2015). Much of this funding 
was used after, rather than before, the trial commenced 
– in some cases, towards the end of the first year. 
The types of services funded were limited in scope, 
focusing on treating assumed vices such as drug and 
alcohol addiction, and an inability to manage finances. 
This narrow focus overlooked funding for community 
development initiatives already on tight budgets, which 
may have more relevance to people on social benefits. 
The ORIMA final evaluation acknowledged the poor 
implementation of service funding: 
Overall, the evaluation found that the support 
services funded through the Trial had not been 
implemented in a timely manner. Many of the 
funded services were not fully operational and 
accessible at the commencement of the Trial. Some 
community leaders felt that this reflected negatively 
on them, as they had ‘promised’ their communities 
that such services would be available when the 
Trial commenced … Some stakeholders also felt 
that communication of the availability and range 
of additional support services funded through the 
Trial, amongst Trial participants as well as service 
providers, had not been effective or sufficient which 
had contributed to a lack of service uptake and 
referrals. (2017b:98–99)
Most notable, however, is the limited reported use of 
these services by people on the CDC. The ORIMA (2017b) 
final evaluation found that only 12% of people they 
interviewed on the card reported using drug and alcohol 
services, and 10% used financial and family support 
services. This suggests that the assumption that people 
on welfare had vices to be serviced by drug and alcohol 
programs, and money management programs was not 
justified. As well, for people wanting to use the services, 
the services were not available in time. 
The community panel
People who were put on the CDC had the option to 
present a case to a community panel to reduce the 
amount quarantined from 80% to 50%; they did not have 
the option to be taken off the card.17 
The panel was not functioning in Kununurra and 
Wyndham until late 2016. When it was running, the 
government agencies selected members of the Kununurra 
and Wyndham communities to review a paper application 
prepared by the individual, and then deliberate and 
decide on a new amount to be quarantined. To submit a 
case to the panel, the individual on the CDC was asked 
to sign a statement giving community members on the 
panel, whose identities and interests were undisclosed, 
access to personal information such as information on 
school attendance, health information, police records and 
housing records. Bilateral agreements were developed 
for sharing information between the various services. In 
other words, the process required someone on the card 
to disclose personal data to an unspecified ‘community’ 
panel, without representation. The panel process assumed 
that people in the region ‘knew’ each other and could 
make fair assessments about each others’ lives, without 
any legal recourse for the individual making the claim. 
The ORIMA (2017b) evaluation acknowledged that the 
panel had limited success. Our research also found that 
it was not clear for many people how the panel worked, 
who was on the panel, and how people on the CDC could 
have legal representation. For example, of the 35 people 
on the card at the time of our survey, 5 knew about the 
panel, 5 had never heard of it, and 20 were not sure if 
they had heard of it.
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Theory of change and inducing hardship
Beyond what was seen by some government officials as 
inevitable teething problems of getting the experiment 
right, the CDC had other impacts on people’s lives that 
could not be straightened out. These impacts related to 
the deficit assumptions underpinning the trial: that the 
overuse of alcohol, illegal drug use and gambling are 
caused by excessive access to cash, and that people 
have a behavioural deficiency limiting their ability to find 
a job. 
Making money management hard
The perception that the overuse of alcohol, illegal drug 
use and gambling are caused by excessive access to 
cash is disconnected from the reality of people living 
on state benefits. For example, one 46-year-old woman 
on the CDC stated, ‘I am capable of managing my own 
money. I don’t need government to tell me how to spend. 
Why tag all of us on the CDC?’ A 50-year-old female 
interviewee on a carer’s payment also stated, ‘I don’t 
like it because it’s taking us back to the ration days, 
telling me how to manage my money as I don’t drink and 
smoke’. Of the 51 people interviewed, most reported 
that their biggest cause of poverty was not behavioural 
or the mismanagement of funds, but simply not having 
enough money. Further, from the 35 interviews of people 
on the card, 31 people said that the CDC trial had made 
the management of their money harder (4 people did not 
answer the question). 
People interviewed said that the card made the 
management of money difficult because they did not 
know where their money was going, and some even 
reported that the card took fees they did not know about 
(25 of the 35 people interviewed on the card thought 
they had been charged fees, and 9 people were not 
sure if they had). A 35-year-old female interviewee on a 
parenting payment and family assistance stated, ‘I don’t 
like it [the card] at all, especially when you have six kids 
and your routine of early hours shopping for school 
lunches can’t happen [because I run out of cash]. It’s too 
stressful’. A 21-year-old female interviewee on a parenting 
payment and family assistance said, ‘I prefer the old 
system, [I had] more cash on hand. With the card, I am 
always finding out about different balances when I check. 
Fees are charged. I am not happy as I cannot save’. A 
25-year-old female interviewee stated, ‘[The card is] not 
helping, I don’t like the white card. I cannot save’. Another 
female interviewee with four children stated, ‘I don’t agree 
with what I have been told; it has mucked my paydays up; 
it’s very hard for me and my children. It’s very stressful’. 
Similarly, Hunt (2017), in her analysis of the ORIMA interim 
evaluation, raised questions about the CDC causing 
difficulty for vulnerable people: ‘55% of transactions 
on the cards failed due to insufficient funds … that is 
nearly 21 000 transactions where people were unable to 
purchase what they wanted’ (Hunt 2017:5). Despite the 
trial’s assumptions about the overuse of alcohol, illegal 
drugs and gambling, less than 1% of failed transactions 
were because people were trying to use the card for 
prohibited items (Hunt 2017).
The CDC dramatically limits the amount of cash people 
have. Yet cash is an important aspect of living in remote 
areas (Peterson 1991, Altman 2015). Remote economies 
in Australia do not operate under the free market logic 
that government policy promotes. Indeed, remote 
economies in the Kimberley include not just the public 
(or state) sector and the private sector but also the 
nonmarket or customary sector. These characteristics 
in remote Australia are what Altman (2005) has termed 
the ‘hybrid economy’. Cash circulates through the state 
and market sectors of the hybrid economic frameworks, 
but also through the nonmarket sector when customary 
activity is exchanged for cash payments (e.g. painting, 
hunting, labour) (Taylor 2004, Altman 2005) and when 
people invest in means of production outside the market 
sector (e.g. second-hand equipment and tools). The CDC, 
by restricting cash and tying people to stores with CDC 
facilities, can restrict people’s engagement in the hybrid 
economy. 
TABLE 1. Key items for cash use (before the 
Cashless Debit Card)
Item
Percentage of 
respondents
Number of 
respondents 
(n = 51)
Present to give someone 29.4 15
Social events  
(e.g. Kimberley moon) 13.7 7
Eating out 25.5 13
Big item for the home 
(e.g. fridge) 49.0 25
Medicine from the 
chemist 21.6 11
Transport costs  
(e.g. for taxis and buses) 64.7 33
Lunch money for children 21.6 11
Bills 23.5 12
Rent 29.4 15
Fuel 51.0 26
Small grocery shopping 62.7 32
Big grocery shopping 58.8 30
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Cash is also important for people engaging in the private 
and public sectors to purchase goods to meet their 
basic needs. Table 1 shows the responses given by the 
51 people interviewed about what they used cash for 
(before the trial). Transport and lifts around town, big and 
small grocery shopping, and fuel were important cash 
commodities in the East Kimberley. People also reported 
using cash for informal renting arrangements, lunch and 
pocket money for their children, buying second-hand 
goods informally, purchasing fresh food and meat from 
local farms and stations (which can be cheaper than from 
stores in town), and for paying for the show and other 
events coming to town. 
Although the rationale for the CDC is to reduce the 
amount of cash people have to spend on alcohol, 
illegal drugs and gambling (even though there are no 
poker machines in the East Kimberley), the card has 
caused difficulty for people who use cash to support 
basic needs. Table 2 shows the types of key items that 
people found it hard to pay for after the card came into 
circulation. They include transport – which is a key need 
for people to get to their work-for-the-dole responsibilities 
(which have harsh penalties for not showing up) – 
shopping for food, taking children to school and 
attending social events.
TABLE 2 . Items that are harder to purchase 
under the Cashless Debit Card
Item
Percentage of 
respondents
Number of 
respondents 
(n = 51)
Present to give someone 20.0 7
Events  
(e.g. Kimberley moon) 22.9 8
Eating out 14.3 5
Big item for the home 
(e.g. fridge) 80.0 28
Medicine from the 
chemist 68.6 24
Transport costs  
(e.g. for taxis and buses) 65.7 23
Lunch money for children 11.4 4
Bills 48.6 17
Rent 22.9 8
Fuel 20.0 7
Small grocery shopping 22.9 8
Big grocery shopping 65.7 23
Depoliticisation of poverty and unemployment
The material poverty experienced by people receiving 
state benefits in the East Kimberley has structural and 
historical roots. However, the CDC reconfigures and re-
articulates socioeconomic and postcolonial issues as a 
crisis of the individual. 
Poverty in the East Kimberley disproportionately affects 
Indigenous people: 47% of Indigenous people living 
in Kununurra and 32% in Wyndham live on less than 
$20 799 per year, whereas only 12% of non-Indigenous 
people in Kununurra and 13% in Wyndham live on less 
than $20 799 per year (data sourced from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2016 Census data). Tables 3 and 4 
show the median household and individual incomes for 
people living in Kununurra and Wyndham;18 Indigenous 
income levels are far below non-Indigenous levels. 
Poverty is also exacerbated by a higher cost of living; 
the cost of living in the Kimberley is 13% higher than in 
Perth (KDC 2017). Further, Tables 3 and 4 show that the 
likelihood of home ownership is lower for Indigenous 
people in Kununurra and Wyndham. Indigenous people 
in both towns have a higher need for physical assistance 
than non-Indigenous people, and contribute more time to 
unpaid child care.
Material poverty for Indigenous people in the East 
Kimberley is linked to colonial processes (as elsewhere 
in Australia), in that wealth generated has been through 
the exploitation of Indigenous labour and land. The 
development of the town of Kununurra was contingent 
on the flooding of Miriuwung country to create the Ord 
Dam and Lake Argyle, the largest lake in Australia. The 
damming of the Ord River flooded more than half of 
Miriuwung country, including songlines; this is one of 
the most recent acts of dispossession, displacement 
and occupation in Australia’s history (Sullivan 1996). 
As Grudnoff and Campbell (2017) reported, despite 
$2 billion spent on the Ord River Scheme, limited 
benefits have been enjoyed by a few. The scheme has 
resulted in only 260 (predominantly non-Indigenous) 
jobs (Grudnoff & Campbell 2017). Indentured and unpaid 
Indigenous labour built the pastoral industries of the 
East Kimberley, and many families suffered through 
Stolen Generation policies, under which their children 
were taken and used as slave or indentured domestic 
labour in settler households. The 2006 Senate Inquiry 
into Indigenous Stolen Wages acknowledged how 
unpaid Indigenous labour in the Kimberley was used 
to build the very industries generating private profits in 
the East Kimberley today. The inquiry also noted that 
this exploitation of labour has clear links to the material 
poverty many Indigenous people currently experience.19 
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Material poverty in the East Kimberley is therefore 
relational (Mosse 2010); it is a persistent ‘consequence of 
historically developed economic and political relations, 
as opposed to “residual” approaches which might regard 
poverty as the result of being marginal to these same 
relations’ (Mosse 2010:1157). In the East Kimberley, 
relational poverty is a consequence of economic and 
colonial processes compounded by punitive workfare 
and welfare policies, such as the CDC and a work-for-
the-dole scheme (explained below).
Unemployment
The CDC trial compulsorily included most working-aged 
people who are unemployed in the East Kimberley. This 
creates a nexus between unemployment and excessive 
use of alcohol, illegal drugs or gambling, and also 
suggests that behaviours, norms and aspirations of all 
people receiving welfare are currently problematic and 
need to change (which will lead to employment). However, 
the key cause of unemployment in the East Kimberley is 
not a behavioural issue but the absence of formal jobs 
(KDC 2013). The Kimberley Development Commission 
TABLE 3 . Socioeconomic data, Kununurra 
2011 2016
Variable Indigenous
Non-
Indigenous Indigenous
Non-
Indigenous
Population 1335 3018 1158 2897
Population 18 years and over 744 2429 686 2309
Population 18 years and over (%) 55.7 80.5 59.2 79.7
Home owner or purchasing (%) 9.9 52.2 12.4 47.7
Provided child care for own children, and/or other 
children (%) 48.7 27.2 38.3 28.4
Have a need for assistance (%) 5.3 1.5 7.9 2.0
Median personal income ($/week) 355.7 1039.1 428.1 1124.3
Median household income ($/week) 1273.5 1745.5 1293.3 2096.1
Notes:
1. All calculations are based on population 18 years and over.
2. All calculations exclude ‘not stated’ responses.
3. Calculation of median household income is based on place of enumeration; all others are based on place of usual residence.
Source: Data from Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011 and 2016 census data.
TABLE 4 . Socioeconomic data, Wyndham 
2011 2016
Variable Indigenous
Non-
Indigenous Indigenous
Non-
Indigenous
Population 409 287 359 186
Population 18 years and over 253 219 225 151
Population 18 years and over (%) 61.9 76.3 62.7 81.2
Home owner or purchasing (%) 20.2 43.0 14.4 59.1
Provided child care for own children and/or other 
children (%) 42.4 36.3 29.8 23.7
Have a need for assistance (%) 6.3 4.0 7.1 3.3
Median individual income ($/week) 357.7 1064.0 530.0 1294.3
Median household income ($/week) 1168.3 1764.1 1024.9 1781.8
Notes:
1. All calculations are based on population 18 years and over.
2. All calculations exclude ‘not stated’ responses.
3. Calculation of median household income is based on place of enumeration; all others are based on place of usual residence
Source: Data from Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011 and 2016 census data.
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shows that bringing Kimberley Indigenous employment 
to Australia’s average by 2025 would require 120 new 
full-time and ongoing jobs per year until then (80 jobs for 
Indigenous people and 40 for non-Indigenous people). 
The Kimberley Development Commission (KDC 2013) 
argues that, based on the current labour market trends, 
Indigenous employment parity will not be met in the 
Kimberley until around 2040. 
The absence of formal jobs for Indigenous people 
provides employment for non-Indigenous people. Service 
provision for Indigenous people is one of the key areas 
of employment creation for non-Indigenous people in the 
East Kimberley. Health organisations; legal organisations; 
and government departments and agencies such as 
child protection, housing and social services employ a 
workforce of hundreds of staff – disproportionately non-
Indigenous (Empowered Communities 2015, Marrie 2015). 
Despite the limitations of the East Kimberley labour 
market, government policy has abolished programs that 
supported Indigenous labour, such as the Community 
Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme. 
CDEP was established nationally in 1977 and reached 
the Kimberley in the early 1980s. It provided support for 
Indigenous people to undertake productive labour on 
country, and to engage in community and commercial 
activities. CDEP was based on a realisation that 
standard Australian state benefits and employment 
creation institutions were unsuitable for the economic, 
geographic, situational and cultural circumstances 
of Indigenous people living remotely, and that an 
innovative institution that recognised such difference 
was needed.20 CDEP in the East Kimberley supported 
various productive activities such as hunting, fishing, art 
and craft manufacture, land management and ceremonial 
business. As Taylor (2004) observed, such activities 
did have market potential.21 CDEP proved popular, 
and, by 2004, more than 35 000 Indigenous people 
were participating (70% of these in remote Australia), 
and 265 community-based Indigenous organisations 
were administering the scheme (Altman & Klein 2017). 
CDEP was progressively abolished from 2004; since its 
abolition, unemployment has increased by 20% in the 
East Kimberley (KDC 2013).
Despite the lack of formal jobs, the Australian 
Government launched a punitive remote work-for-
the-dole scheme called the Community Development 
Programme (CDP), which claims to prepare people 
for work; however, the work is simply not there.22 This 
means that people in the East Kimberley are not only 
subjected to the quarantining of their state benefits with 
conditions on how they spend their money through the 
CDC; they also have to endure harsh work-for-the-dole 
requirements, including punitive conditions on accessing 
state benefits in the first place.23 CDP requires working-
age participants (18–49 years) to attend manufactured 
‘work-like’ initiatives, up to 25 hours a week, 5 hours 
a day and 5 days a week, for a payment well below 
minimum awards (Altman 2017). The requirements for 
CDP are harsher than the government’s nonremote and 
mainly non-Indigenous jobactive program, leading to CDP 
participants breaching the requirements at a rate 30–40 
times higher than jobactive participants (Fowkes 2016). 
Table 5 shows the dramatic increase in penalties 
for people subjected to CDP in Western Australia24 
after the introduction of the program on 1 July 2015. 
The no-show, no-pay penalty is applied for people 
missing their work-for-the-dole activity. Each no-show, 
no-pay penalty results in the loss of one-tenth of an 
individual’s fortnightly income support payment ($53.88 
of a fortnightly $538.80 Newstart allowance). Three 
days missed can result in an eight-week suspension 
of income support. The Western Australian numbers 
mirror the national trend of a significant increase in 
penalties applied to people on CDP. (Nationally, there 
were 22 984 no-show penalties before CDP; after CDP 
was introduced, this rose to 125 670, showing the 
consequences of the increased punitive approach.)
TABLE 5 . Breaching rates under the Community 
Development Programme, Western Australia 
Penalty
2014–15 
financial 
year
2015–16 
financial 
year
Increase in 
penalties 
(%)
No-show, no-pay 
incidents 4 297 22 662 527
Total 8-week non-
payment periods 599 2 629 438
Total financial 
penalties 6 734 25 621 380
Some people in the East Kimberley have tried to resist 
being subjected to both the CDC and CDP. Workers at 
the CDP facility in Kununurra went on strike, citing their 
frustration at being penalised twice. They asked why, if 
CDP was work (as the government claimed), they had to 
be on CDC (which targets the unemployed). Despite the 
overlap between government policies and their impact 
on people’s lives, government analysis is reluctant to 
examine these links.
Despite the historical and structural links to poverty 
and unemployment, those targeted for the CDC trial are 
judged on their apparent failure to be good economic 
citizens by the very account that they are in need of state 
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assistance. It is assumed that their poverty or hardship 
is a matter of behaviour, and, under the right economic 
incentive/disincentive structure, their behaviour will 
improve to a level consistent with, and acceptable to, 
the rest of the population. Andrew Forrest (2014:133) 
states in the chapter ‘Breaking the welfare cycle’ in the 
Forrest review, … for most people a quick, small “hit to 
the wallet” can be the most effective incentive to change 
behaviour’. However, poverty and inequality in the East 
Kimberley are not matters of individual behaviour, but are 
relational features of Australian settler colonial capitalism.
Constructing community and 
fragmenting social relations
The Australian Government claims that the CDC trial 
was community based and driven by the community. 
For example, Alan Tudge, the Minster for Human 
Services, who led the introduction of the CDC in the 
East Kimberley, stated in a media release the day he 
introduced legislation into the House of Representatives 
to authorise the trials of the card: 
Government has been working closely with 
communities on the ground co-designing the 
parameters of the trial ... When community 
leaders stand up and call for reform to better their 
community, governments should listen and that is 
exactly what we are doing. (2015:1)
The declaration of working with the community gives the 
perception that the trial was ‘invited’ and ‘co-designed’ 
by those in the East Kimberley, despite its being a 
government program proposed in the Forrest review. 
The government recruited a limited number of residents 
and organisations operating in the East Kimberley to 
become the ‘community’ face of the trial.25 This group’s 
involvement was key for the government to secure 
the trial’s implementation, given the high degree of 
contestation for the CDC across the East Kimberley. 
The leaders signing onto the CDC, whether intending to 
or not (see below regarding issues with the consultation 
process), took on work of the Australian Government 
through the CDC trial. This included espousing 
government rhetoric about the card, speaking in the 
name of the diverse population in support of the card, 
administering aspects of the card by sitting on the 
community panel, and, importantly, taking the brunt 
of criticism from people on the card. In August 2017, 
Lawford Benning, Chair of the Miriuwung Gajerrong 
Corporation, retracted his support of the CDC 
(Davey 2017).
Our research finds that the trial is highly contested, and 
the decision for the card was anything but a community 
decision that represented the region’s diverse population. 
Tudge and others use the term ‘community’ to imply 
homogeneous support, but the community of the East 
Kimberley comprises diverse peoples in colonial, class 
and gender dynamics. Some people had more of a 
say than others, and the claim that the CDC trial was 
community led is misleading. In its submission to the 
senate inquiry into the CDC, the Miriuwung Gajerrong 
Corporation raised concerns about the unrepresentative 
nature of the trial, noting that, although the ‘Department 
of Social Services (DSS) states that the Cashless Debit 
Card program was co-designed with local leaders in 
Kununurra … in reality, only four local leaders were 
consulted in relation to the introduction of the CDC in 
Kununurra’. 
Of the 51 people we interviewed who were on the CDC 
(16 before the trial and 35 during the trial), only 2 people 
felt that the government had spoken to the right people 
who represented their community, 25 people said 
that they were not the right people (they were leaders 
from organisations but not from the community), and 
23 people were not sure if they were the right people or 
not. People in these interviews highlighted that some 
people signing their community onto the card were 
leaders but either were not the right leaders or did not 
include all the leaders. One interviewee called this ‘white 
person’s research’, implying that the consultation was just 
with white people or those aligned with white people. The 
government consultation about the card was tokenistic in 
the sense that the frame of reference was never open to 
change. Instead, consultation was about selling the card 
to those they spoke to, and not participatory, such that 
other alternatives could be proposed and pursued.26 
Even the leadership signing up to the card were confused 
about the intent of the trial and what it would entail.27 
For example, in a town meeting organised for people to 
express their frustration to the leaders, various key figures 
acknowledged that they did not have all the details of the 
trial from the government before the trial started. Some 
also had the understanding that the panel would have the 
ability to take people completely off the card, which was 
not the case. 
Furthermore, although some of the leadership signing 
the region on to the card did support the government’s 
rationale for a CDC, it was not that clear-cut for others. 
Instead, some agreed to take the card as a way to get 
much-needed funds for service delivery, since some 
Indigenous organisations in the East Kimberley were 
feeling extreme financial pressure in a tight funding 
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environment after witnessing the defunding of Indigenous 
organisations through the Australian Government’s 
Indigenous Advancement Strategy.28 Other leaders 
felt that the trial was an opportunity for Empowered 
Communities,29 a network of Indigenous organisations, 
to get the government to take them seriously to support 
their broader objective of being a vehicle for Indigenous 
governance across the East Kimberley. Both reasons 
point to a situation in which there was little real choice 
but to accept the CDC. 
The pressure placed, and tactics used, on communities 
by the Australian Government to accept the trial can be 
further seen in the example of Halls Creek. Halls Creek 
was an initial location identified by the government to trial 
the CDC, but the shire rejected the proposal. The Halls 
Creek Shire conducted its own extensive consultation 
with remote communities to garner the views of residents 
about the proposed trial. These consultations found that 
residents had considerable informed concerns about 
the trial.30 The shire councillors voted against having 
the trial, even though they were under considerable 
pressure by government to accept the trial. Minutes from 
the council meetings refer to a visit by the then Western 
Australian Minister for Regional Development, Terry 
Redman, warning the shire that it might miss out on funds 
in the Western Australian regional reform if it rejected 
the trial.31 After Redman’s visit, the shire councillors 
again voted against the trial. This shows the pressure 
placed on leaders when they disagree with, or refuse, 
the government’s will. The implications of saying no to 
the trial remain to be seen, given that the regional reform 
funding is still being worked out.
Excluding community 
The Australian Government has used the term 
‘community’ and ‘leadership’ to give the impression that 
the CDC was a local initiative with grassroots support. 
Yet, when they were being selected for the trial, large 
groups of people in the East Kimberley, especially 
dissenting voices, were dismissed and excluded. 
Overlooked were the views of many recipients of state 
benefits who were to be put on the card. These people 
were portrayed as not understanding, or having the ability 
to understand, the logic of the card. Concerns voiced 
in interviews show that people on the card had very 
legitimate and informed concerns about the trial and its 
possible impacts on the community:
I think it is quite racist, I think it breaches our civil 
liberties and it’s a bunch of crap. They tarred us with 
the same brush.
I think its unfair – it’s targeting us people living in 
remote towns. It is going to cause problems. Why do 
they give old people trouble? It’ll mean old people 
get bashed for money. There will be more violence. 
We’re going backwards in Australia – back to the 
ration days. I think it will cause even death in this 
community. Young people on drugs, it will cause 
violence and suicide.
It’s not gonna help people that been drinking or 
smoking all their lives. People like that will just start 
drinking brake fluids and methylated spirits. 
Should not have happened to us in the first place, it’s 
not going to change anything. I was better off before 
the welfare card been announced.
These views of the community are discarded as 
‘disgruntled’ and not taken seriously. Narratives of 
deficit, dysfunction and irrationality usurp any ability to 
question the card’s usefulness. Often, proponents of 
the card have viewed any reported hardship by people 
on the card as caused by alcohol and drug use. The 
frustration and hardship experienced by people on the 
card are delegitimised, as these people are assumed to 
be alcoholics and gamblers. Hardship is a mechanism 
used to get participants to accept new norms and 
behaviours. The extent of the disempowerment felt by 
those on the card through exclusion was hard to gauge; 
however, of the 51 people we interviewed, only 6 felt that 
their concerns about the card would be listened to, 21 
said they would not be listened to, and 23 were not sure if 
people would listen to them. 
The card was socially fragmenting not just in the way 
it divided people through the limited consultation and 
approval, but also because it physically stratified people 
by identifying card users in social spaces. Because the 
card stops purchases of alcohol at the merchant level, 
shops that serve both alcohol and food, such as pubs 
and restaurants, were either banned from accepting the 
CDC or, in the case of key pubs in Kununurra, had two 
tills in operation. In the latter case, people on the CDC 
could only use one of the tills, which identified them to 
other patrons. 
Resistance and agency 
Many saw the CDC as an extension of the government’s 
ongoing desire to regulate and control Indigenous lives 
and subjectivities. Although many punitive government 
interventions were under way in the East Kimberley, such 
as the defunding of remote communities through regional 
reform and punitive work-for-the-dole requirements, it 
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was the CDC that was the symbol of settler colonialism. 
Although the card aimed to change the behaviours of 
(mostly Indigenous) people receiving state benefits, it was 
not successful. Instead, there was resistance.
Within weeks of the card’s rollout, the card was given an 
entirely new name among those on it: the White Card. 
At no stage has the card been white (it is silver), so this 
is a curious reflection. When asked, both those on the 
card and government workers reflected that the card 
was renamed the White Card because it was imposed by 
white people. It is unclear how this name emerged, but 
its impact was instant. Within weeks, few people called it 
anything else in the East Kimberley. Every time the name 
White Card was uttered, a space of subtle resistance 
was created. The response from the government and 
Indue reflected this: survey participants told us that Indue 
refused to serve clients who called the card White Card.
Two large meetings were held in the main park of 
Kununurra at which people subjected to the CDC 
voiced their concerns. The leaders who had agreed 
with the government to bring in the card were invited to 
listen to the frustration of people on the card, and their 
families. More than 80 people attended this meeting 
and expressed their concerns about why the card 
was compulsory and why only a few people had been 
consulted. There was also a petition for the Australian 
Government to stop the trial in the East Kimberley, which 
was signed by more than 100 people. 
People found ways around the CDC, such as swapping 
goods paid for by the card for cash (often for a lower 
amount). The card also put people in further vulnerable 
situations; some key informants reported people having 
sex for cash or moving away from the trial site. Some 
people just never picked up their card, and thus cut 
themselves off state payments to avoid being subjected 
to the trial. For those suffering from addiction, the 
assumption that the restriction of cash would support 
their rehabilitation seems over-optimistic at best, and 
dangerous at worse. In the interviews, people spoke of 
instances in which people found had ways to support 
their addictions without cash, or had left town. 
In response to European occupation, both physical and 
behavioural, Indigenous people have always resisted 
in ways that have delegitimised the narrative of settler 
colonialism (Watson 2009). Responses to the CDC have 
included ways for people to reclaim power to counter 
bureaucratic power. The government discredits and 
racialises such agency as dysfunctional. It refuses to 
acknowledge and actively undermines the productive and 
emancipatory potential of Indigenous agency.
Conclusion
The logic behind the CDC, and income management 
more broadly, has developed in conjunction with 
other policy initiatives. It is connected with the rise of 
paternalism as part of the neoliberal turn of Australian 
social and economic policy (Altman 2014, Cahill 2014, 
Strakosch 2015). The discourse underpinning neoliberal 
logic is of scarce economic resources, such that 
all citizens must accept state austerity and be self-
disciplined in making the right (economic) choices. 
Although rhetoric calls on all sectors of society to do 
the ‘heavy lifting’ (as the former Federal Treasurer Joe 
Hockey called it), the burden of austerity falls on the 
most vulnerable in society (Engels 2006, Standing 2011, 
Stanford & Taylor 2013). This is because the unemployed 
or those not working are seen as exhibiting a behaviour 
deficiency. This view overlooks the increasing failure of 
the labour market to provide full, secure and dignified 
employment, particularly in remote and regional 
areas. In Australia, governments, while also targeting 
non-Indigenous people, have aggressively pursued 
Indigenous people through income management and 
harsh work-for-the-dole measures (Fowkes 2016, Jordan 
2016), as well as defunding ‘unproductive communities’ 
through Western Australia’s regional reform. 
The trial of the CDC in the East Kimberley is perverse 
contemporary Indigenous policy. Not only did the trial, 
by limiting the amount of cash, bring material hardship, 
it furthered the disempowerment of those marginalised 
by relational poverty. The terms ‘community’ and 
‘consultation’ were used by government and advocates of 
the card as a tactic to give the impression that the diverse 
populations in Kununurra and Wyndham were unified in 
approval of the card. They do not reflect the substantive 
opposition to the card from many people living in the 
study site; indeed, the White Card has become a symbol 
for disempowerment and neocolonial government control. 
Use by the Australian Government of bespoke ‘evidence’ 
to tell only the story that the government wants to be 
heard is disturbing. It has two purposes: to continue the 
trial and expand the program in other regions, and to 
obfuscate the reality that the CDC’s logic is deeply flawed 
and reliant on jobs that do not exist. The card cannot 
achieve the aims it seeks, as the framing is perverse and 
disconnected from the lives of those on the card. 
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Notes
1. 565 of the 752 people in the Ceduna trial and 984 of the 1199 
people in the East Kimberley trial are Indigenous (Australian 
Human Rights Commission 2016:91–92). Nationally, 2.7% 
of the Australian population identified as being of Aboriginal 
and/or Torres Strait Islander origin in the 2011 Census.
2. Freedom of information (FOI) documents relating to 
consultation in Halls Creek communities about the 
introduction of the CDC (later rejected) show that the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), 
when communities asked where the card comes from, 
stated ‘the Forrest Review’. This was a review carried out by 
mining magnate Andrew Forrest into Aboriginal training and 
employment (FOI consultation in Mulan (WA), September 
2015).
3. Other elements that show the CDC as primarily an 
Indigenous program include the key role that PM&C has 
played in developing and rolling out the CDC trial in both 
sites, despite social security being the responsibility of 
the Department of Social Services and the Department of 
Human Services. PM&C has responsibility for Aboriginal 
policy. Further, the card was proposed for approval in the 
East Kimberley to organisations within the Empowered 
Communities – an Aboriginal organisation network (and not 
non-Indigenous organisations).
4. Contract (number CN3323493) awarded to Indue for 
operations: $7 939 809.00. Contract (number CN3290604) 
awarded to Indue for the information technology build: 
$2 870 675.50.
5. The evaluation was released the same day as the 
announcement that the trial would be extended, even 
though the government had been planning to extend the 
trial for some time. For example, Indue was issued with 
written notice to extend its contract implementing the CDC 
past the original end date of 21 April 2017, six weeks before 
the government made the extension public (information 
obtained under FOI request no. 16/17-141).
6. See Hunt (2017) for a good summary of the key 
methodological flaws in the ORIMA evaluation.
7. The interim ORIMA evaluation also notes the increase in 
crime, particularly youth crime: ‘many stakeholders reported 
an increase in the following illegal/harmful behaviours 
among youth people/children: robberies/thefts/vehicles 
and dwellings – stakeholders reported that in these cases 
young people were in search of cash; and petty crime 
(e.g. pickpocketing and “snatch and grab”) – stakeholders 
reported that children on bikes were often the perpetrators 
in these cases’ (ORIMA 2017a:163).
8. The ORIMA interim evaluation does state that ‘a few 
stakeholders identified some increase in domestic violence/
intervention orders – although it was not clear whether the 
increase was due to changes in reporting requirements, 
the policing approach or increased community awareness, 
understand and willingness to take action’ (ORIMA 
2017a:163).
9. The Howard Government’s Northern Territory Emergency 
Response implemented measures including bans on alcohol 
consumption, bans on pornography, quarantining of state 
benefits, highly regulated tenancy arrangements that 
disallowed different residential arrangements, compulsory 
acquisition of township leases from the legally recognised 
owners to facilitate governmental controls, and appointment 
of government business managers with legal rights to 
monitor the meetings of community organisations and with 
absolute powers in townships (Altman 2007).
10. See the Second Reading speech for the Social Security and 
Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) 
Bill 2007; the Northern Territory National Emergency 
Response Bill 2007; and the Families, Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment 
(Northern Territory National Emergency Response and Other 
Measures) Bill 2007.
11. Communications about the CDC in 2014 state that it is 
not income management. This perhaps is to put distance 
between the trial in the Kimberley and the government-
commissioned multiyear independent evaluation of New 
Income Management in the Northern Territory (see Bray 
et al. 2014).
12. No-one was paid to take part in the current study, and no-
one on the card refused to take part in the survey. Some key 
informants did decline an interview, especially those working 
in government departments.
13. Construction of Aboriginal pathology in the Kimberley 
has had a long history. In 2014, the Aboriginal settlement 
of Oombulgurri, just out of Wyndham, was dramatically 
bulldozed because it was claimed to be so dysfunctional, 
including with regard to the sexual abuse of children. Instead 
of dealing with the sexual offenders in the settlement, 
the whole population was forcibly removed to the town of 
Wyndham, where the waiting time for housing can be up to 
eight years. Applications for public housing made in 2008 
are only being processed in 2016.
14. The ORIMA evaluation commissioned by the government to 
test the trial did not register any quantitative consumption 
data or responses from trial participants before the rollout of 
the CDC. Instead, the ‘Initial conditions report’ is primarily 
based on qualitative research (interviews and focus groups) 
with key stakeholders (mainly services) in each of the 
trial sites.
15. See also Watson (2009), who showed how crisis was used 
in a similar way to bring in the Northern Territory Emergence 
Response in 2007.
16. Some Indigenous people do not have identification because 
their births were not registered or they do not have birth 
certificates. This can cause issues in securing licences and 
other forms of recognised identity cards, which are needed 
to pick up postal items (Castan & Gerber 2015).
caepr.anu.edu.au
17. A vague process was developed by the Department of 
Social Services (DSS), in which an individual can seek a 
social worker to assess their case. If the assessment shows 
severe impacts on the individual’s wellbeing, the social 
worker can make recommendations to DSS for the individual 
to be removed from the trial. It is not clear how many people 
have been successful through this process, but the number 
is low, given that the number of people on the trial has not 
decreased significantly.
18. These data are based on the whole population in the two 
towns and not just those on the CDC. At the time of writing 
this paper, data on employment and unemployment had not 
been released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
19. For example, in her submission to the Standing Committee 
on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Professor Anna 
Haebich (2006) argues, ‘Aboriginal people played a major 
role in building the state economy in the pastoral and rural 
industries in the north and south of the state. It was the 
state government’s discriminatory employment system 
that prevented Aboriginal workers from benefiting from the 
Australian labour system, which was hailed around the world 
as an exemplary model for protecting workers’ wages and 
rights. Instead, Aboriginal people were subject to a disabling 
system which denied them proper wages, protection 
from exploitation and abuse, proper living conditions, and 
adequate education and training. So while other Australians 
were able to build up financial security and an economic 
future for their families, Aboriginal workers were hindered by 
these controls. Aboriginal poverty in Western Australia today 
is a direct consequence of this discriminatory treatment’ 
(Parliament of Australia 2006:29).
20. Refer to Jordan (2016) for an extensive analysis of CDEP. 
John Taylor discussed the specific importance of CDEP in 
the East Kimberley (see Taylor 2004, 2008).
21. Taylor (2004) references the Warmun community arts centre, 
which in 2004 made an annual turnover of $1 000 000, and 
‘has 88 artists registered, and employs 18 of these full-time 
with earnings well above the regional average’ (p. 114).
22. Another Australian Government workfare initiative, which 
links state benefits to work outcomes in the East Kimberley, 
is transitional housing. Transitional housing puts conditions 
on people wanting to access housing, under which they 
must prove that their children have at least 85% school 
attendance; at least one adult in the house must be in work; 
and the family agrees to transition into private rental or 
private home ownership (normally between two and three 
years, with a maximum of five years). Transitional housing 
started in Kununurra between the Western Australian 
Housing Authority and the Wunan Foundation. It was 
extended to other parts of the Kimberley and is set to further 
expand under the regional reform.
23. Although CDP has a similar name to CDEP, there is a drastic 
difference between the two (see Jordan & Fowkes 2016).
24. The Western Australian numbers are shown because FOI 
requests for Kimberley-specific information on breaching 
rates were unsuccessful. The reason given was a concern 
that CDP providers could be identified. However, informants 
who have seen the breaching rates in the East Kimberley 
have indicated a dramatic increase in breaching in both 
Kununurra and Wyndham since CDP was introduced.
25. Organisations originally named as championing the card 
included the Wunan Foundation, the Miriuwung Gajerrong 
Corporation, the Waringarri Aboriginal Corporation and 
East Kimberley Job Pathways (a joint venture between the 
Australian Government and the Wunan Foundation). Both 
East Kimberley Job Pathways and the Waringarri Aboriginal 
Corporation were named in the contract between the 
Department of Social Services and Indue as supporting the 
rollout of the CDC in the East Kimberley (FOI request no. 
16/17-141).
26. See Cooke and Kothari (2001) for a good analysis of the 
limits and possibilities to community participation.
27. The tokenism displayed by the CDC process is in direct 
conflict with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Aboriginal Peoples, which calls for free, prior and informed 
consent. For example, article 19 outlines that ‘States shall 
consult and cooperate in good faith with the Aboriginal 
peoples concerned through their own representative 
institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed 
consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them’.
28. In 2014, much of the $4.8 billion relied on by Aboriginal 
sector organisations was put to tender by the government 
under what was called the Indigenous Advancement 
Strategy (IAS). The IAS forced organisations, many 
small and unfamiliar with such processes, to apply in 
a competitive funding process. As a result, Aboriginal 
applications constituted only 40% of the total and a smaller 
26% of successful grants. Further, the average size of 
grants was $663 000 – much less than the average sought 
of $2.8 million (see Altman 2015). The funding cuts were 
significant, as many organisations were already struggling 
under financial pressure, and having only partial funding 
severely affected many organisations’ ability to undertake 
their work.
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29. The Empowered Communities network is a group led by 
various individuals from eight Indigenous groups across 
Australia. In 2014, it was supported by senior policy 
officials from both the Australian and state governments, 
senior business leaders and a $5 000 000 grant to publish 
the Empowered communities: empowered peoples – 
design report. The report sets out a model for Indigenous 
development and empowerment for the eight regions 
(including the East Kimberley), with the long-term goal 
of a national rollout. The network expressly states its 
alignment with the recommendations of the Forrest review 
and promotes controversial welfare reform such as income 
management. However, what is outlined in the Empowered 
Communities report is different from how Empowered 
Communities operates in the East Kimberley. Many 
organisations are involved in Empowered Communities in 
the East Kimberley not because there is a clear understand 
of, and/or affinity with, the theory of change underpinning its 
model of development, but based on a concern of missing 
out on funding, exposure and opportunity.
30. Independent of the shire’s own consultation, PM&C 
conducted its own meetings with residents in remote parts 
of the shire. Documents received via FOI requests show that 
questions recorded from the residents to the department 
also show informed concerns about the trial.
31. The shire meeting minutes held on 19 November 2015 
state, ‘That the council notes that the Minister of Regional 
Development met with the President and Chief Executive 
Officer on 11 November 2015; notes that the Minister 
expressed concern regarding the Shire’s public opposition 
to the trial of the cashless debit card in the Shire and as 
part of a wider trial in the East Kimberley; notes that the 
Minister indicated that if the Shire was not to be part of 
the East Kimberley trial area it would not benefit from 
investment resulting from the Regional Services Reform for 
the Kimberley’ (p. 9).
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